Meet Industrial Control System (ICS) Requirement

As IT and OT networks converge, they enable greater production efficiency but also expose OT systems to increased cyber threats. PickPacket Interface Server is designed to protect the communication in both IT and OT/ICS domains.

Protect your ICS now with PickPacket

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About PickPacket

In today’s digital landscape, cybersecurity is essential for ensuring the safety and availability of Industrial Control System (ICS) networks and processes.

PickPacket Interface Server (PPIS) is designed to strengthen network segmentation, serving as the first line of defense for security teams.

It provides a robust solution that helps organizations meet ICS security standards, including ISA99 and ISA/IEC 62443, while integrating seamlessly within the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture (PERA) or any network framework.

  • The first line of defense to IT/OT security risks
  • Deep packet inspection and filters with criteria based on informed decision and packet validation
  • Load balanced internal nodes to manage heavy connection
  • Protect and mask technology blueprint from detection
  • A unified handler for SSL/TLS certificates across nodes

PPIS In The Network Segmentation


Deep Packet Inspection and Filteration

For years, attackers have assailed network and system level vulnerabilities, fueling demand for products like firewalls and intrusion detection systems. We provide a Deep Packet Inspection and Filteration (DPIF) that is compatible with your Industrial Control System (ICS).

Node Balancing

We offers as very efficient distrubute traffic to several nodes and to improve performance, scalability and realiability of data movement.

Zero Trust

At its core, Zero Trust is a security model and design philosophy that assumes any user or device could be a potential threat. Its goal is to remove the inherent trust that is granted to users in traditional 'castle and moat' style architectures. By adopting PickPacket, more controls can be deployed because the sole separation in the network segmentation is not sufficient.

Network Segmentation

Keeps external users from directly accessing the control system (Levels 0-2 of ISA-95). Reduces the risk of cyber threats by ensuring that remote connections pass through security layers before reaching critical systems.

1903

Attack - Wireless Hack

Marconi Marconi's wireless telegraph presentation hacked with Morse code.

2000

Attack - Maroochy Water

A cyber-attack caused the release of more than 265,000 gallons of untreated sewage.

2010

Malware - Stuxnet

The world's first publically known digital weapon.

2010

Malware - Night Dragon

Attackers used sophisticated malware to target global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies.

2011

Malware - Duqu/Flame/Gauss

Advanced and complex malware used to target specfic organizations, including ICS manufacturers.

2012

Campaign - Gas Pipeline Cyber Intrusion

ICS-CERT identified an active series of cyber-intrusions targeting the natural gas pipeline sector.

2012

Malware - Shamoon

Malware used to target large energy companies in the Middle East, including Saudi Aramco and RasGas.

2013

Attack - Target Stores

Hackers initially gained access to Target's sensitive Fnancial systems through a third-party that maintained its HVAC ICSs, costing Target $309M.

2013

Attack - New York Dam

The U.S. Justice Department claims Iran conducted a cyber-attack on the Bowman Dam in Rye Brook, NY.

2013

Malware

Havex An ICS-focused malware campaign.

2014

Attack - German Steel Mill

A steel mill in Germany experienced a cyber-attack resulting in massive damage to the system.

2014

Malware - Black Energy

Malware that targeted human-machine interfaces (HMIs) in ICSs.

2014

Campaign - Dragonfly/Energetic Bear No. 1

Ongoing cyber-espionage campaign primarily targeting the energy sector.

2015

Attack - Ukraine Power Grid Attack No. 1

The first known successful cyber-attack on a country's power grid.

2016

Attack - Kemuri Water Company

Attackers gained access to hundreds of the programmable logic circuits (PLCs) used to manipulate control applications, and altered water treatment chemicals.

2016

Malware - Return of Shamoon

Thousands of computers in Saudi Arabia's civil aviation agency and other Gulf State organizations wiped in a second Shamoon malware attack.

2016

Attack - Ukraine Power Grid Attack No. 2

Cyber-attackers tripped breakers in 30 substations, turning off electricity to 225,000 customers in a second attack.

2017

Malware - CRASHOVERRIDE

The malware used to cause the Ukraine power outage was fnally identifed.

2017

Group - APT33

A cyber-espionage group targeting the aviation and energy sectors.

2017

Attack - NotPetya

Malware that targeted the Ukraine by posing as ransomware, but with no way to pay a ransom to decrypt altered Files.

2017

Malware - TRITON/Trisis/HatMan

Industrial safety systems in the Middle East targeted by sophisticated malware.